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2014 Fed Challenge Script: Current State of the Economy
Abstract
Good afternoon everyone and thank you for having us here today. Though the recession began in 2007 and
officially ended in 2009, recovery has been painfully slow. GDP growth has been insufficient to close the
output gap, there continues to be slack in the labor market and inflation has stabilized below the Federal
Reserve percent target. We are not meeting our dual mandate of full employment and stable prices even 6
years after the end of the recession. Despite some signs of strengthening in the economy during the past year,
we do not believe that economy is on a self-sustaining path of recovery. Furthermore, the monetary policy
actions taken by the Fed thus far to pull us out of the Great Recession have been insufficient. We propose a
substantial strengthening of the our forward guidance; specifically, a commitment not to raise the federal
funds rate until nominal GDP has returned to a path that we consider consistent with the dual mandate.
[excerpt]
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2014 Fed Challenge Script
by: Jieran Liu, Will Northrop, Matthew Nadler, 
Owen Rothe, and Ryan Williams
Economics 267 & 367 Fall 2014
Current State of The Economy
 Good afternoon everyone and thank you for having us here 
today. Though the recession began in 2007 and officially ended in 2009, 
recovery has been painfully slow. GDP growth has been insufficient to 
close the output gap, there continues to be slack in the labor market and 
inflation has stabilized below the Federal Reserve percent target. We are 
not meeting our dual mandate of full employment and stable prices even 6 
years after the end of the recession. Despite some signs of strengthening in 
the economy during the past year, we do not believe that economy is on a 
self-sustaining path of recovery. Furthermore, the monetary policy actions 
taken by the Fed thus far to pull us out of the Great Recession have been 
insufficient. We propose a substantial strengthening of the our forward 
guidance; specifically, a commitment not to raise the federal funds rate 
until nominal GDP has returned to a path that we consider consistent with 
the dual mandate. 
 The Congressional Budget Office estimates the output gap to be 
around 3.6% in 2014 and projects a return to full employment by 2017. 
However, this forecast reflects the fact that the CBO has revised downward 
its estimate of potential GDP every year for the last 7 years. The economy is 
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approaching full employment not because of strong growth in actual GDP 
but because of repeated downward revisions in potential GDP. [VoxEU 
slide] Larry Summers estimates that half of the decline in potential output 
is due to a drop in the capital stock due to lower investment since 2008, a 
phenomenon that could be reversed with sufficient economic expansion. 
 The unemployment rate fell to 5.8 percent in October, at the top 
end of our current range of estimates for the natural rate of 5.2 percent 
to 5.8 percent. But, the low unemployment rate disguises a large amount 
of slack in labor markets. For instance, the labor-force participation rate 
has fallen from 65.9percent to 62.8 percent since the beginning of the 
recession. While some is due to structural factors, research by Stephanie 
Aaronson and her co-workers finds that 0.25 – 1.0 percent of the decline 
is due to cyclical factors. The employment - population ratio is low, also 
suggesting cyclical factors contributing to unemployment. Probably the 
most convincing evidence of slack in the labor market is the failure of 
wages to rise significantly: average nominal hourly earnings increased 
only 2.2 percent in the year ending in October. 
 Inflation has been below the 2 percent target since 2012. According 
to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the core PCE chain-type price index 
increased at a rate of only 1.4 percent for the twelve months ending in 
October. There are no signs of inflationary pressure in the economy. Oil 
prices have fallen in recent months due to global economic weakness and 
new energy supplies. The price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil has 
fallen to $81 per barrel at the end of October from over $100 in June. 
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In addition, the dollar has appreciated significantly against other major 
currencies, putting downward pressure on prices of imported goods. And 
again, wage growth has been subdued. The absence of inflationary pressure 
is apparent from the decrease in the spread between the yields of 5-year 
nominal Treasury Securities and 5-year TIPS bonds (or the ‘breakeven 
inflation rate’) which has fallen from 2 percent in June to 1.6 percent in 
November. This indicates that the market expectations are currently that 
inflation will fall short of the target for the next five years.
 The current sustained weakness in the economy is likely to persist 
for a long time. The crash in the housing market weakened household 
balance sheets. Research by Atif Mian and Amir Sufi has shown 
convincingly that the debt overhang has contributed to weak consumption 
growth. Richard Koo calls this a ‘balance sheet recession’ and notes that 
recovery will be slow because of household deleveraging, which reduces 
consumption spending. Koo and other economists such as Larry Summers 
and Olivier Blanchard warn of the possibility of insufficient aggregate 
demand for as long as the next 10-15 years.
 A self-sustaining recovery cannot occur until households have 
worked off the debt overhang. Data on household debt show that there is 
a long way to go. Total credit market debt of households is 105 percent of 
disposal income, still higher than any year before 2002. Consistent with 
Koo’s theory, household savings remains high, especially relative to pre-
recession trends. The personal saving rate has been above 5 percent since 
the recession, compared to 2-4 percent from 2005-07. Recovery in the 
housing market is widely seen as essential for improvement in household 
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finances. But after signs of strength in 2013 the housing market has cooled 
off in 2014. Acording to Case-Shiller home price index, house prices fell 
1.3 percent from April to August of this year. Real residential investment 
has fallen by one percent in the year ending in the third quarter of 2014.
 Recent positive developments have caused speculation that we 
will start raising interest rates in mid-2015. This is premature. Though 
GDP growth was estimated to be 3.5% in 2014 Q3, the widening of the 
trade deficit for September suggests that this figure will likely be revised 
downward.The results of the midterm elections suggest that fiscal policy 
could become more of a drag on economic performance in the near 
future due to increased pressure to cut spending. The low employment 
growth domestically, coupled with slow projected growth for Europe and 
certain emerging economies, suggest that making monetary policy less 
accommodative would be premature and costly to a still-shaky American 
economy. 
Our Policy Recommendation: Clarify Forward Guidance 
 With the phasing out of large-scale asset purchases last month, 
we are currently relying on forward guidance to reduce long-term interest 
rates. But the type of forward guidance that we have employed since 2009 
has been less effective than it could be. From  August 2011 to October 
2012 we specified that  we would keep the federal funds rate near zero until 
a particular date, a policy known as calendar-based forward guidance. In 
December 2012 the we switched to a data-based forward guidance strategy 
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by promising not to raise the federal funds rate until the unemployment rate 
fell to 6.5%. But in March 2012, as the unemployment rate was dropping 
more quickly than anticipated, we changed our criteria to a mix of labor 
market conditions. Michael Woodford has argued that the our statements 
to this point have not had the desired effect because the we have not been 
clear enough about the criteria that we will use to judge whether to raise 
the federal funds rate.  As a result the we have not been as successful in 
managing long-term interest rates as it could be.
 We propose that the Federal Reserve clarify the criteria that will 
trigger the beginning of interest rate increases. Under our proposal, which 
is similar to recommendations made by Michael Woodford and others, the 
FOMC will pledge to maintain the federal funds rate target at its current 
range as long as nominal GDP remains below a deterministic path. This 
path would represent the path it would have followed if monetary policy 
had not been constrained policy by the zero lower bound since 2008. 
Specifically, as indicated by our proposed statement, we project a trend of 
4% annual growth in nominal GDP from the fourth quarter of 2007. We 
commit to holding off on interest rate increases until we are close to the 
target. When we are close to the target we will begin to increase interest 
rates at a measured pace so that policy is normalized at the trend level of 
GDP.
 Our proposal improves on the current forward guidance strategy 
in the following ways.
●	 The nominal GDP criterion clarifies the ultimate goals of the 
FOMC. It replaces the vague references in the current statement 
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to “a wide range of information, including measures of labor 
market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation 
expectations, and readings on financial developments.” We 
thereby send a clearer signal to the public about how much more 
growth must occur before the we begin to raise interest rates.
●	 We estimate that under this proposal we will not begin raising 
interest rates for at least two years. This is a more expansionary 
signal than the current policy, under which expectations are for 
rate increases beginning next summer, which will lower long-
term interest rates.
●	 The nominal GDP criterion promises a combination of real 
economic expansion and higher inflation. The prospect of 
economic expansion will increase consumer and business 
confidence and generate higher spending. The prospect of higher 
inflation will generate more spending by lowering real interest 
rates. Higher inflation also reduces the real value of household 
debt, which will assist in recovery of balance sheets. This is an 
improvement over the current policy, which risks signaling to the 
public that the Fed views the current state of the real economy 
and inflation under two percent as satisfactory outcomes.
 We have prepared some forecasts of what our policy implies 
for the economy. The scenarios shown on the graph assume that the real 
output gap is currently 4 percent and the growth rate of potential GDP is 
2 percent. Real GDP has grown at an annual rate of 2.3 percent in each of 
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the last two years. At this pace, it will take over 13 years for the economy 
to reach full employment.
● Nominal GDP is currently 8.7% below the nominal GDP trend 
line that we hope to achieve. We assume that trend nominal GDP 
grows at 4% per year.
● Scenario 1 assumes that the combination of lower long-term 
interest rates and increased expectations of growth and inflation 
causes nominal GDP to reach its target in two years. This requires 
nominal GDP to grow at an average rate of 8.4% per year. 
Inflation in excess of current levels is unlikely unless there is a 
strong pickup in real GDP growth, so it is reasonable to assume 
that nominal growth is roughly evenly divided between real 
growth and inflation. This would imply 4.2% real growth and 
4.2% inflation per year, which would eliminate the output gap in 
the year that the nominal GDP target is achieved.
● Scenario 2, which we believe is more likely, assumes that the 
nominal GDP trend line is reached in three years. This requires 
nominal GDP to grow at an average rate of 6.9 percent per year. 
If growth is evenly divided between real growth and inflation, this 
implies 3.5 percent real growth and 3.5% inflation per year, and 
again the output gap is eliminated when the trend line is reached.
● Scenario 3 assumes a four year path to recovery. This requires 
nominal GDP to grow at an average pace of 6.2 percent per year. 
Real GDP grows at 3.1 percent and inflation is 3.1 percent, and the 
output gap is eliminated when the trend line is reached.
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 Our policy risks higher inflation if the output gap turns out to be 
smaller than we believe it is. For example, under Scenario 2, nominal GDP 
grows at a rate of 6.9 percent per year. If the output gap is two percent rather 
than four percent, we could conceivably see the output gap eliminated 
in two years and real growth falling to two percent in year three, which 
would imply a 4.9 percent rate of inflation in that year. Clearly inflation 
at that level is not acceptable in the long run, but a temporary burst of 
inflation is a small price to pay for full recovery from the recession. In 
the final analysis, even in the high inflation scenario the average inflation 
rate beginning in 2007 will be near the our target of 2 percent; the higher 
period of inflation we promise for the most part merely compensates for 
the below-target inflation of the last several years. 
 To conclude, we find that the economy is in worse shape than it 
appears to be judging from the unemployment rate and the CBO’s estimate 
of the output gap. The Federal Reserve has fallen short of its mandate of 
full employment and price stability since the recession began in 2007. Our 
proposal offers a chance to restore full employment and price stability. It 
does so by clarifying the our forward guidance statement: specifically, by 
committing us in terms that are as explicit as possible to a period of growth 
and reflation. It is a bold step, but one that is absolutely necessary in light 
of current economic conditions. Thank you for listening, and we welcome 
your questions.  
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